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PATENT PROTECTION OF 
PHARMACOLOGICALLY ACTIVE 
METABOLITES: THEORETICAL AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ON THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF FOUR REGIONS* 
Richard Li-dar Wang† and Pei-Chen Huang†† 
Abstract 
Active metabolite patents have been instrumental for brand-
name pharmaceutical companies to maintain their exclusivity even 
after the drug patents expire. This strategy obstructs market entry of 
generic medicine and reduces affordable drugs. The authors review 
jurisprudence from the United States, Europe, India, and Taiwan in 
search for practical solutions to confront this problem. Given the 
unique pharmacological value that active metabolites may possess, 
patent protection for those purified or synthesized in vitro should be 
preserved, but for those produced by metabolism should be declined. 
Except India, most countries under investigation comport with this 
dichotomy. Their jurisprudence may be subsumed into three possible 
solutions. The United States and the United Kingdom adopt the 
inherent anticipation doctrine; yet depriving artisan recognition of 
novelty analysis makes this doctrine highly controversial. The product 
of nature doctrine gravely suffers from incoherence and uncertainty 
in judging patentability. The non-practice theory, as articulated by 
Taiwan’s Intellectual Property (IP) Court, avoids these shortcomings. 
The unambiguity and sound rationale further support this theory to be 
the preferable solution among the three. 
  
 
 *  This article draws partially on Pei-Chen Huang’s LL.M. thesis “Investigation of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Considering the theoretical foundations of the patent system 
from a utilitarian perspective,1 the basic rationale for the existence of 
patent rights is to trigger a series of economic activities that benefit 
society by providing inventors (or their successors) with the legal 
right to exclude others from practicing their inventions (right to 
exclude). Innovation and invention are sources of technological 
improvement for society. However, because innovations possess the 
characteristics of public goods, they are often appropriated by 
competitors, resulting in free riding.2 Providing inventors with 
exclusive rights can prevent competitors from copying inventions 
without their permission and destroying the opportunity to recover 
their research and development costs from the market. In this 
 
 1. See generally Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 31, 47-48 (1989). 
 2. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13-14 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress 
of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-26 (1989). 
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situation, patents act as incentives to invent. They encourage 
exploration of new inventions, and prevent free riding that may result 
in an insufficient investment of research and development.3 
Additionally, when new inventions are developed, they must 
undergo a lengthy process of commercialization. Adequate product 
designs and efficient manufacturing processes must be instigated, 
which enable technological inventions to be actually applied to 
commercial commodities, thereby being employed in the market and 
benefiting the consuming public. Patents can provide incentives to 
commercialize as well. The protection of patent rights can attract 
necessary funding for supporting the expenditure of 
commercialization and market development. Furthermore, due to the 
fact that inventors have to disclose the technological content of their 
innovations when applying for patents, the exclusive patent terms 
induce inventors from keeping their innovations confidential.4 This is 
a major incentive to disclose new technical development, and an 
important method for encouraging public accumulation and exchange 
of state-of-the-art technological information.5 
However, the awarding of exclusive patent terms creates 
conflicting interest between inventors and the public. This conflict 
occurs in the pharmaceutical field as well. Drug patents can satisfy 
the profit demands of pharmaceutical manufacturers, and assist with 
accumulating and sustaining research and development funding and 
capability. However, the fact that patent protection excludes 
unlicensed generic manufacturers from producing the same drug often 
runs contrary to the patient’s need for affordable medicine. 
Additionally, pharmaceutical companies often prosecute and obtain 
secondary patents to further extend the exclusivity period of brand-
name drugs, which usually comes from primary patents on active 
ingredients of the drugs, so as to block generic manufacturers even 
longer and pursue the brand-name manufacturers’ own interests. This 
strategy creates the phenomenon of “patent evergreening.”6 Medical 
products and pharmaceuticals are indispensable resources for saving 
human life and health. Extending brand-name exclusivity over time 
 
 3. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1024-28; Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits 
of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 
229 (2001). 
 4. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1028-30. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They 
Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 401 n.44 (1999); Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights 
in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 (2005). 
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through secondary patents not only runs counter to fairness and 
equality, but is also closely related to public health. Recently, this 
problem of drug patent evergreening has received significant 
international attention. That suggests this troublesome issue is 
gradually spreading throughout the world, and urgently requiring 
proper resolution. 
The issue of evergreening drug patents is potentially resolvable 
from two angles: patentability and rights enforcement. Technically, 
secondary patents are normally derived from the active ingredient of 
the drug, including its enantiomers, position isomers, geometrical 
isomers, homologues, crystalline forms, and so on. The authors 
choose to focus on active metabolites, of which the patentability and 
infringement litigation have been controversial in recent years. In this 
study, they thoroughly investigate the jurisprudence of different 
countries, engaging in a technical and legal assessment of their 
approaches to this issue, and critically evaluating their advantages and 
disadvantages respectively. 
This article begins with a brief introduction of pharmacologically 
active metabolites, the role they play in pharmaceutical treatment, and 
the controversies they may bring about in patent law. In Parts III 
through VI, the authors examine, respectively, how the United States, 
Europe, India, and Taiwan manage the patentability and enforcement 
issues arising from active metabolites. In Part VII, the authors 
introduce insightful theoretical perspectives and technological 
analysis, subsuming the jurisprudence of those four regions into three 
potential solution models. The article further addresses the questions 
whether these models are consistent with the role of active 
metabolites in pharmaceutical research, and whether patent law is 
aiming at encouraging valuable inventions instead of monetizing 
basic pharmaceutical principles that are not truly innovative. Finally, 
the conclusion of this study is summarized in Part VIII. 
Pharmacologically active metabolites are produced by the human 
metabolism, which is purely a natural reaction of the human body, not 
subjectively known to or controlled by the patient who is taking the 
medicine. This reaction is not based on conscious behavior by 
humans, but instead constitutes an automatic biological mechanism 
that is part of the digestion system. Metabolites are therefore much 
closer to products of nature than to human inventions. It seems 
inadequate to grant patents on those substances. Nevertheless, the 
discovery and in vitro manufacturing of these substances has 
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considerable technological value in the pharmaceutical industry.7 
Therefore, the awarding of patents to this type of metabolites should 
still be permitted. This study concludes that the product of nature 
doctrine8 and the non-practice theory9 can both yield the same end 
result. However, because the product of nature doctrine may present 
risks of excessively denying patents for other types of pharmaceutical 
research results, it would be more appropriate to adopt the non-
practice theory articulated by Taiwan’s Intellectual Property Court in 
their judgment. 
II. ACTIVE METABOLITES AND PATENT LAW 
When pharmacologically active ingredients are used in the body, 
some of the compounds are absorbed and directly produce 
physiological effects, whereas others must undergo a series of 
metabolic reactions to achieve the desired result. A number of cases 
have indicated that the metabolites of the original compounds are 
pharmacologically active as well. Additionally, studies have found 
that the pharmacological effect of some compounds originates 
entirely from their metabolites, meaning the administered compound 
is itself inactive. The desired pharmaceutical effect can be obtained 
only through the body’s natural metabolism and the resulting 
metabolites.10 Because of the limited current knowledge into human 
physiology, pharmaceutical firms typically do not understand how a 
drug works on the pharmacological level when putting it on the 
market. It sometimes takes a number of years after launching the drug 
for those companies to figure out the pharmacokinetic mechanism of 
that drug and then apply for a patent on the active metabolite. 
The chemical structure of pharmacologically active metabolites 
differs from the compounds originally administered. Theoretically, it 
is patentable if a metabolite is novel, non-obvious, and possess 
sufficient utility. However, granting patents on active metabolites has 
sparked significant controversies, the core issue of which is whether 
the intake or marketing of drugs known to generate specific active 
metabolites actually infringes patents covering the metabolites of 
those drugs. In practice, after drug patents have expired, 
 
 7. See infra Part VII.A for a specific example and further explanations. 
 8. See infra Part VII.C. See generally JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PATENT LAW 226-29 (2d ed. 2006). 
 9. See infra Part VII.D. 
 10. PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS FOR CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: FUNDAMENTALS OF GLOBAL LAW, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY 231 (4th ed. 
2004). 
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pharmaceutical manufacturers alternatively assert active metabolite 
patents, if any, against those who manufacture and sell generics of the 
same drug, in an attempt to extend their market exclusivity in real 
terms. Consequently, active metabolites have become the subject of 
secondary pharmaceutical patents. Patents on active metabolites thus 
might delay the arrival of generic drugs on the market, which prevents 
the public from enjoying the benefit of more affordable medicine after 
the original patent has expired. 
Since active metabolites are arguably just the flip side of the 
original pharmaceutical compounds, this type of extending brand-
name exclusivity is somewhat frustrating in light of the basic rationale 
of the patent system, which is to promote innovation, 
commercialization and technology disclosure with only a limited 
period of exclusivity.11 However, active metabolites are also just a 
type of chemical compounds, and denying patent protection for a 
new, useful and non-obvious metabolite would be contrary to the 
principles of modern patent laws. In the following chapters, the 
authors investigate the relevant jurisprudence of the United States, 
Europe, India, and Taiwan, with an aim of exploring and identifying 
feasible solutions to reconcile this dilemma. 
III. ACTIVE METABOLITES IN U.S. LAW 
The first U.S. case that deals with the issue of active metabolites 
is Zenith v. Bristol-Meyers,12 where the Federal Circuit considers the 
patent claims might encompass active metabolites, yet reverses the 
ruling of induced infringement below for the reason that no evidence 
in the record rightly comparing the patent claims with the drug that 
allegedly formed the active metabolites after being ingested by 
patient.13 In a number of later cases, however, U.S. courts are inclined 
to hold that the sale or use of drugs known to produce specific active 
metabolites does not constitute an infringement of active metabolite 
patents. Those opinions include varying reasons to reach this 
conclusion.14 
 
 11. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. 
 12. Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 13. Id. at 1421-24. 
 14. For an overview of U.S. cases tackling the active metabolite issue, see Andrew W. 
Torrance, Physiological Steps Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1471, 1478-99 (2008). 
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A. Marion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. 
The court in Marion Merrell Dow uses claim construction to 
pass a judgment of non-infringement.15 Merrell Dow held the U.S. 
Patent No. 3,878,217 (’217) that claimed the compound terfenadine 
and its use as a treatment for human allergic reactions. The ’217 
patent expired in 1994, when Baker Norton submitted an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA) to the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), hoping to manufacture and sell the 
corresponding generic drug after the patent expired. Merrell Dow 
initiated infringement litigation after learning of this submission, 
alleging that Baker Norton’s manufacturing and selling of the generic 
terfenadine infringes the unexpired Patent No. 4,254,129 (’129), also 
held by Merrell Dow. The ’129 patent covers terfenadine’s active 
metabolite, terfenadine acid metabolite (TAM), and its use as a 
treatment for allergic reactions. Merrell Dow argued that Baker 
Norton’s manufacture and sale of the generic drug would constitute 
active inducement of infringement because TAM would be produced 
in patients’ livers after consuming Baker Norton’s generic drug.16 
Baker Norton subsequently filed a counterclaim, arguing that because 
patients were already using TAM prior to the application for the ’129 
patent, and TAM had already implicitly been disclosed in the ’217 
specification, TAM was anticipated by the ’217 patent and thus lost 
its novelty. 
In this case, the court focused on construing the claim terms of 
the ’129 patent. The court indicated that its primary task for literal 
infringement analysis involves defining the meaning and scope of the 
claims at question. The court has the authority and obligation to 
interpret the textual meaning of the claims, taking into consideration 
the intrinsic evidence such as the specification and prosecution 
history.17 In this case, the claim term in dispute was the word 
“compound.” Merrell Dow asserted that this term covers TAM 
produced in vivo through the liver’s metabolism and those 
synthesized in vitro as well. Baker Norton countered that the same 
word represents only TAM that was synthesized in vitro.18 The court 
 
 15. Marion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Fla. 
1996). 
 16. Id. at 1051-53. 
 17. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 18. Marion Merrell Dow Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 1053-54. 
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pointed out in its ruling that although the claim did not clearly define 
the production method of the “compound,” it also contained nothing 
suggesting that TAM was generated through human metabolism. The 
court indicated that Claim 10 of the disputed patent recited the 
pharmaceutical composition of TAM in unit dosage form, which 
involved the combination of an effective amount of TAM with a 
“significant amount of a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier,” and 
hence the claim should rightly be restricted to TAM obtained from in 
vitro synthesis. On the other hand, if the claim included TAM both 
produced through in vivo metabolism and in vitro synthesis, as 
alleged by Merrell Dow, it could only cover the in vivo TAM that had 
been extracted from the human body, and combined with the 
pharmaceutical carrier after purification. However, this seemed 
unreasonable to the court and in pharmaceutical practice. Based on 
this construction, the court decided that the “compound” in the 
disputed patent should be restricted to TAM obtained from in vitro 
synthesis.19 
The court further stated that patent specifications should be 
consulted when constructing claims. The specification of the disputed 
patent explained in detail TAM’s chemical formula, efficacy, and 
usage. However, it lacked the information that TAM could be 
produced by human metabolism. This implies that “compound” in the 
disputed patent claim should be restricted to in vitro synthesis. 
Additionally, the prosecution history of a patent constitutes other 
primary evidence that should be considered when constructing 
claims.20 The court stated that Claims 1 and 2 of the disputed patent 
were virtually identical when initially presented by Merrell Dow. The 
only difference between Claims 1 and 2 was that Claim 2 specified 
the compound as “an essentially pure compound of TAM.” The patent 
examiners rejected the claims on the basis that “no appropriate 
distinction exist[ed] between these two claims in the specification.” 
Merrell Dow then withdrew Claim 2 to get Claim 1 allowed by the 
examiner. Furthermore, Merrell Dow acquiesced to the patent 
examiners’ interpretation that the term “compound” in Claim 1 is 
restricted to pure TAM by withdrawing Claim 2. The court pointed 
out that this type of behavior, where a patent applicant had restricted 
the range of her claims during patent prosecution and then later 
attempted during litigation to recover what she previously had 
 
 19. Id. at 1054. 
 20. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. 
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forfeited, should be strictly prohibited.21 On this basis, the court held 
that “compound” in the disputed claim should be restricted to in vitro 
synthesis. Thus, the TAM produced by the metabolism of patients 
consuming terfenadine did not fall within the scope of the ’129 patent 
and did not constitute a direct infringement. As a result, Baker 
Norton’s manufacturing and selling of generic terfenadine did not 
constitute active inducement of infringement.22 Merrell Dow’s 
subsequent appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) was dismissed by the parties, ending litigation.23 
B. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
In this later case,24 the U.S. court used the “inherent anticipation 
doctrine” to address the issue of whether selling and using the original 
drugs constituted an infringement of active metabolite patents. In this 
case, the plaintiff Schering Corp. held U.S. Patent Nos. 4,282,233 and 
4,659,716. The ’233 patent claimed loratadine, an antihistamine 
substance, which was used to suppress allergic reactions without the 
side effect of drowsiness. Schering Corp. labeled loratadine as the 
active component of the drug bearing the brand name Claritin. The 
’716 patent claimed descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL), another 
antihistamine compound and the active metabolite of loratadine, did 
not cause drowsiness either. The ’716 patent did not expire until April 
2004, whereas the ’233 patent expired earlier in 2003. After the ’233 
patent expired, a number of pharmaceutical companies intended to 
manufacture and sell the generic version of loratadine, which needed 
the FDA approval. Since the Schering Corp enlisted the ’716 patent in 
the Orange Book as patents protecting its Claritin product, generic 
producers in order to obtain FDA approval of their ANDA 
submissions asserted that the patent is invalid. In response, Schering 
Corp. initiated infringement litigations against Geneva and a number 
of other generic manufacturers.25 
While engaging in claim construction, the trial court held that the 
claim to DCL in the ’716 patent included both “production through 
metabolism” and “in vitro synthesis.” Both parties agreed to this 
interpretation. The trial court stated that the ’233 patent did not 
 
 21. Marion Merrell Dow Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 1055-56. 
 22. Id. at 1057. 
 23. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc. v. Baker Norton Pharm., Inc., 152 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (unpublished table decision). 
 24. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Schering Corp. II), 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 25. Id. at 1375-76. 
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explicitly disclose DCL or references to metabolites of loratadine. 
However, DCL is inevitably produced and present as a metabolite 
when following the method of administering loratadine as specified in 
the ’233 patent. Applying this claim construction, the trial court 
determined that the DCL claim in the ’716 patent is already inherently 
anticipated by the ’233 patent. Thus, the claim failed the novelty 
requirement and was therefore invalid.26 
Schering Corp. appealed to the CAFC, and the appellate court 
passed a judgment substantially identical to the ruling of the trial 
court. The CAFC stated that when a single earlier reference had 
exposed all of the technological features of the claimed invention 
under dispute, the patent was invalid because the invention was 
anticipated and its novelty was thus lost. Furthermore, even if the 
piece of prior art did not disclose a certain technological feature of the 
disputed invention, if the omitted element is inherently implied or had 
to be present according to the disclosure of that reference, the 
disputed invention was anticipated as well.27 The appellate court 
further suggested that according to previous case law, the application 
of the inherent anticipation doctrine did not demand that the person 
having ordinary skilled in the art (PHOSITA) had to recognize the 
omitted element being inherent in the prior reference. If the 
technological feature that the reference failed to expressly describe 
had to be formed or was present when following the teaching of a 
single prior art, regardless of whether a PHOSITA could identify the 
omitted element or not, the inherent anticipation doctrine still applied, 
and the disputed claim was invalid due to a lack of novelty.28 
The court further explained that in the earlier Continental Can 
case,29 the court’s rationale did not demand that the PHOSITA having 
to recognize all omitted elements from a single prior art before the 
inherent anticipation doctrine could be applied. The Continental Can 
decision only stated that the court could consult with the PHOSITA to 
clarify the disclosure of specific former references, including the 
technological features that were missing but inherently implied. The 
CAFC did not accept the argument advocated by Schering Corp. that 
“the PHOSITA recognizing the omitted elements” is a necessary 
condition for inherent anticipation. Regardless of whether the 
 
 26. Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Schering Corp. I), 275 F. Supp. 2d 534, 540-
42 (D.N.J. 2002), aff’d, 339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 27. Schering Corp. II, 339 F.3d at 1377. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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PHOSITA realized that the ’233 patent inherently embraced the 
compound DCL at the filing date of the ’716 patent, the inherent 
anticipation doctrine might still be applicable.30 
The CAFC noted that the facts of this case differed from 
previous ones, where the inherent anticipation doctrine was applied. 
In those cases, portions of technological features claimed in the 
disputed patent had already been explicitly disclosed in a prior 
reference, while only some features were inherently implied. In this 
case, however, the ’233 patent failed to explicitly disclose any 
features of DCL. Thus, the focus of applying the inherent anticipation 
doctrine in this instance was not any specific omitted features but 
rather DCL as a whole.31 Nevertheless, the CAFC held that the main 
consideration for determining whether the claimed subject matter had 
been omitted yet was inherent in a prior reference was whether the 
cited reference had placed the subject matter in the public domain; 
that is, whether the general public had already freely made, used or 
sold the subject matter. Patents cannot be awarded to retrieve 
inventions from the public domain to the patentee’s proprietary 
terrain. Therefore, “if granting patent protection on the disputed claim 
would allow the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the 
prior art, then that claim is anticipated.”32 This basic principle persists 
regardless of whether the PHOSITA understands all of the 
configuration or underlying scientific knowledge of the prior art 
reference. Therefore, the court ruled that the inherent prior art 
anticipated the entire invention as well as single elements within an 
invention.33 In this case, the scientific data showed that the use of 
loratadine necessarily resulted in the DCL compound through human 
metabolism. The court finally ruled that the ’233 patent inherently 
anticipated the DCL claims in the ’716 patent.34 
The CAFC further distinguished the conditions in this case with 
those in cases of accidental anticipation.35 In the present case, DCL 
was not produced accidentally or under unusual situations, rather 
 
 30. Schering Corp. II, 339 F.3d at 1377-78. 
 31. Id. at 1378-79. 
 32. Id. at 1379-80 (quoting Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999)). 
 33. Id. at 1380. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Tilghman v. 
Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). Cf. Chem. Cleaning, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 379 F.2d 294, 296-
97 (5th Cir. 1967). Monomethylthiourea breaks down and produces thiourea as claimed in the 
patent when applied to industrial boilers. This conversion is intentional and does not happen in 
human bodies. 
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unavoidably generated when administering loratadine in ordinary 
circumstances. The formation of DCL was an intrinsic outcome of 
patients consuming loratadine.36 Moreover, the CAFC pointed out 
that a qualified prior art reference capable of refuting a disputed 
invention’s novelty must allow a PHOSITA to make or use the prior 
art accordingly. Although the ’233 patent did not describe how to 
manufacture the isolated DCL compound, disclosure of “any” method 
capable of manufacturing DCL would have sufficed to satisfy the 
enablement requirement under the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 
112.37 Since patients consuming loratadine had already been 
described in the ’233 patent, and DCL will necessarily be generated in 
the human body, the court found that the ’233 patent was an enabling 
prior art that inherently anticipated the DCL claims of the ’716 
patents.38 
C. Analysis 
U.S. courts have so far adopted different approaches to reach the 
same conclusion of non-infringement on the issue whether the 
manufacturing, sale or consuming of drugs known to produce specific 
active metabolites infringes on patents claiming those metabolites. In 
the two sets of cases, the patents at bar were similarly drafted, both 
containing claims to the active metabolites, claims to the processes of 
synthesizing the active metabolites in vitro, claims to combinations of 
the active metabolites and drug carriers, and claims to the 
metabolites’ methods of use. The court in Merrell Dow used claim 
construction as an instrument to resolve the dispute on active 
metabolites. In Schering Corp., however, the CAFC eschewed claim 
construction and resorted to the inherent anticipation doctrine. The 
reason for this disparity might come from the fact that both parties in 
Schering Corp. conceded as to the interpretation of the key claim term 
“compound” to be limited.39 
More importantly, the way that the CAFC explains inherent 
anticipation in Schering Corp. has incited numerous theoretical and 
 
 36. Schering Corp. II, 339 F.3d at 1378. 
 37. Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation 
Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1144-54 (2008) (arguing for a heightened enablement 
requirement for patent-defeating prior art reference, in order to avoid using the inherent 
anticipation doctrine). 
 38. Id. at 1149. 
 39. A third approach that U.S. courts have ever used to address the issue of active 
metabolites is the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, No. 90-0242, 
1990 WL 121353, at *11-14 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 936 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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practical discussions.40 After this decision, obtaining patents for 
active metabolites has increased in difficulty, because a patent claims 
an active metabolite only through its chemical formula, the inherent 
anticipation doctrine still applies, potentially anticipating such a 
claim. It is noteworthy, however, that the Schering Corp. decision did 
not totally deny any patent protection for active metabolites. The 
court indicated in this decision that patents can be granted on purified 
or isolated active metabolites, or on their methods of use or 
composition with other substances.41 
IV. ACTIVE METABOLITES IN EUROPEAN LAW 
In comparison, the European Patent Office (EPO) holds a 
conservative stance on the inherent anticipation doctrine. In light of 
controversies regarding this doctrine, the EPO has not adopted it so 
far, thus refrained from denying categorically the novelty of active 
metabolite inventions.42 However, does administering a drug infringe 
on its active metabolite patent, and consequently manufacturing 
generics of this drug constitute active inducement of infringement? 
The EPO’s sole responsibility concerns patent examination and 
awarding, not handling patent infringement litigation. Thus, the courts 
of each European nation independently decide the controversy 
described above. 
In the case of Marion Merrell Dow Inc. v. Baker Norton 
Pharmaceuticals Inc., the plaintiff Merrell Dow used the same 
arguments to file infringement suits against the defendant Baker 
Norton in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
courts of the three countries all employed different reasoning to reach 
the same conclusion of non-infringement. In Germany, the Munich 
District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on the basis of equity. 
The court found the compound manufactured and marketed by the 
defendant to be identical to the terfenadine claimed in the plaintiff-
owned expired patent. However, the court further reasoned that when 
 
 40. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Schering Corp. III), 348 F.3d 992, 
993-96 (Fed. Cir. 2003); H. Sam Frost, The Unique Problem of Inventions Which Are Fully 
Enabled and Fully Described, But Not Fully Understood (Merrell Dow’s Terfenadine 
Revisited), 20 INTELL. PROP. J. 369 (2007), available at 
http://www.bereskinparr.com/files/file/docs/PatentTerfenadineFrost.pdf; Ben Herbert, Note, 
When Nature’s Anticipation Inherently Prevents Your Discovery: A New Look at an Overlooked 
Requirement of Patentability and Its Impact on Inherent Anticipation, 50 JURIMETRICS 111 
(2009). For further discussion of the inherent anticipation doctrine, see infra Part VII.B. 
 41. Schering Corp. II, 339 F.3d at 1381. 
 42. GRUBB, supra note 10, at 233. 
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the allegedly infringing behavior is entirely within the scope of 
exclusive rights of an expired patent, this behavior cannot infringe on 
any other valid patent. The plaintiff later appealed to the German 
Higher District Court, which agreed with the district court’s 
judgment. It further elaborated that any person can freely use 
technologies from expired patents, since the patentees of those 
technologies have been amply rewarded during the earlier exclusivity 
period of the corresponding patents. Finally, Merrell Dow appealed to 
the German Federal Supreme Court, which denied review of its 
appeal, therefore finalizing the lower court’s judgment.43 In summary, 
both German and U.S. courts in this case did not invalidate the 
controversial claims of active metabolites, but merely maintained that 
the defendant’s behavior was outside the scope of indirect 
infringement. 
Conversely, the court in the United Kingdom invoked the 
inherent anticipation doctrine to address this infringement action. The 
court held the active metabolite claims at issue to be invalid, therefore 
finding no patent infringement by the defendant.44 As part of the 
claim construction, the House of Lords45 ruled that the disputed TAM 
compound claim encompasses both TAM produced through 
metabolism in the human body and synthesized in vitro. The court 
analyzed this dispute by differentiating two types of anticipation: 
anticipation by use and by disclosure. Specifically, Lord Hoffman 
discussed the novelty issue in the alternative by answering the 
following two questions: (1) Does patients’ use of TAM prior to the 
filing date of the disputed patent constitute prior art to the claim in 
that patent, thus defeating its novelty? (2) Or does the disclosure of 
the earlier dated ’217 patent similarly constitute prior art to the 
disputed patent’s claim? The House of Lords then stated that although 
the EPO’s decision is non-binding on the U.K. courts, since the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) shall be followed by all 
contracting countries with the EPO being an important agency in 
interpreting this convention, the EPO’s opinions should be respected 
by the U.K. courts. 
 
 43. Frost, supra note 40, at 380-81. 
 44. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. H. N. Norton & Co., [1996] R.P.C. 76 (UKHL 1995). 
 45. Before the U.K. Supreme Court established operations in October 2009, the House of 
Lords was the highest judicial authority in the United Kingdom. Twelve Lords of Appeal in 
Ordinary (Law Lords) tried cases appealed from appellate courts. See Introduction to the Justice 
System: The House of Lords, JUDICIARY OF ENG. AND WALES, 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/introduction-to-justice-system/the-house-of-
lords (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). 
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Regarding the anticipation by patients’ prior use of TAM, the 
court by referring to previous EPO cases,46 held that only when prior 
usage provides the sufficient and necessary information of the 
disputed invention to enable a PHOSITA to practice it, does this 
usage defeat the novelty of the invention at issue. In the case of TAM, 
patients were entirely unaware that after administering terfenadine 
their bodies would automatically generate TAM to achieve the 
desired pharmaceutical effect. Thus, this use alone did not disclose 
any technological features of TAM, and neither did it enable the 
PHOSITA to practice the invention of the TAM compound. 
Consequently, the invention of the TAM compound maintained its 
novelty despite the patients’ prior use of terfenadine.47 
Nevertheless, the House of Lords ruled that the technical 
disclosures in the ’217 patent still defeated the novelty of the TAM 
claim. Their key point in determining this issue was whether the prior 
patent provided enough information to enable a PHOSITA to practice 
the disputed invention. The House of Lords states that although the 
’217 patent did not disclose how to manufacture pure TAM, it 
described how administering terfenadine will produce chemical 
reactions in the patient’s body and thereby achieving antihistamine 
effects, which the House of Lords deemed sufficient to allow “any 
person” to produce TAM through metabolism. In other words, the 
technical disclosure in the ’217 patent provided sufficient information 
to enable the PHOSITA to make TAM. Under the above premises, 
even if the prior art reference did not disclose all the technological 
features of TAM, TAM was still in the prior art, and therefore lacked 
novelty.48 
A number of commentators suggested that despite the U.K. 
decision of Marion Merrell Dow Inc. referencing earlier EPO cases, 
inconsistencies still remained between this decision and the EPO’s 
conservative attitude toward applying inherent anticipation doctrine. 
In previous EPO cases, the boards of appeal held that a prior 
reference inherently disclosing the technological features of the 
disputed invention is insufficient to anticipate this invention and 
defeat its novelty. Prior art references must actually “convey” 
technological features to the public for the disputed invention to be 
found not novel. Thus, even if the implementations of technologies 
 
 46. Mobil Oil III / Friction-Reducing Additive, No. G 2/88, [1990] O.J. EPO 93 (Bd. 
App. Dec. 11, 1989). 
 47. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., [1996] R.P.C. at 84. 
 48. Id. at 87. 
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from prior art references unavoidably allow people to practice later 
claimed inventions, those inventions should still be recognized as 
undisclosed as long as the references themselves do not explicitly 
convey any technological features of these inventions to a 
PHOSITA.49 This position is contrary to the view expressed by the 
U.K. House of Lords in Merrell Dow. However, the decisions by the 
EPO have only referential value and are not mandatory for the courts 
in EPC member states. Given these contradictory stances by the EPO 
and U.K. House of Lords, it remains to be seen whether the EPC 
members would resolve this issue and develop a harmonized common 
approach.50 
In brief, the United States and various European countries have 
diverged in their solutions to the problem of active metabolite patents. 
After Schering Corp., the U.K. and U.S. approaches appear to 
converge. Both counties adopted the inherent anticipation doctrine 
denying novelty to active metabolites on the basis of earlier technical 
disclosure of the drug that converts in vivo into the metabolite. Under 
this doctrine, patents are granted only for active metabolites that are 
purified or synthesized in vitro.51 Thus, the United Kingdom and the 
United States displayed a more narrow and restrictive attitude towards 
the patentability of active metabolites. 
V. ACTIVE METABOLITES IN INDIAN LAW 
Regarding active metabolite patents, Section 3(d) of India’s 2005 
Patents (Amendment) Act and the explanation passed together with 
the Amendment recognize metabolites as “new types of known 
substances”, in principle considered identical to known substances 
and thus unpatentable. Only those metabolites that differ significantly 
in their characteristics regarding efficacy are deemed patentable.52 
 
 49. Christopher Floyd, Novelty under the Patents Act 1977: The State of the Art after 
Merrell Dow, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 480, 483 (1996). 
 50. Similar to the United States, there is also a U.K. decision that held active metabolites 
infringing on the original compound claims under the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., 
Beecham Grp. Ltd. v. Bristol Labs. Ltd., [1978] R.P.C. 153 (UKHL 1977). 
 51. For further discussion of the inherent anticipation doctrine, see infra Part VII.B. 
 52. Section 3 of the Indian Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005, No. 15, Acts of 
Parliament, 2005 (India) provides the following: 
 [T]he mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not 
result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere 
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere 
use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results 
in a new product or employs at least one new reactant. 
 Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, 
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Furthermore, the Indian Patent Office and the High Courts have held 
that substantial increase in bioavailability, physical or chemical 
stability do not satisfy this exception of enhancement of the known 
efficacy.53 Accordingly, obtaining patents for active metabolites in 
India is extraordinarily difficult. 
The attitude of India is surely adverse and restrictive towards 
awarding metabolite patents. Typically, scholars in the developing 
world believe that active metabolites are “natural products” from 
known substances. They are not “creations” or “inventions,” and thus 
should not be patentable, regardless of whether they are formed 
through metabolism or synthesized in vitro.54 Before the 2005 
Amendment the India Patent Office originally adopted a similar 
position. In particular, the 2005 Draft Manual of Patent Practice and 
Procedure of the Office stipulated that active metabolites are not 
patentable, regardless of whether their efficacy differs from the 
original drugs.55 Thus, scholars have speculated whether the addition 
of the enhanced efficacy exception to the 2005 Amendment was just 
to conform to Article 27.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement), 
which provides that inventions in any field of technology may apply 
for and equally enjoy patent protection without prejudice.56 
VI. NOTEWORTHY COURT DECISIONS IN TAIWAN 
There is no provision in Taiwan’s patent law or patent 
examination guidelines to address the problem of active metabolites. 
As for court decisions, a 2008 case by the Intellectual Property Court 
 
polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, 
complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known substance shall be 
considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties 
with regard to efficacy. 
Id. 
 53. Susan Fyan, Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and Section 3(D): A Comparative 
Look at India and the U.S., 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 198, 210-11, 216-17 (2010). 
 54. See, e.g., Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: 
Developing a Public Health Perspective 18 (Univ. of Buenos Aires, Working Paper, 2007), 
available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Correa_Patentability%20Guidelines.pdf. 
 55. PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (DRAFT) app. I § 
5.4, at 140 (2005) (India). 
 56. Linda L. Lee, Note, Trials and TRIPS-ulations: Indian Patent Law and Novartis AG 
v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 282-85, 292-95 (2008); Tanuja V. Garde, 
Circumventing the Debate over State Policy and Property Rights: Section 3(d) of the Indian 
Patents Act Law, in PATENTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD: 
LIBER AMICORUM JOSEPH STRAUS 243, 246-50 (Wolrad Prinz zu Waldeck und Pyrmont et al. 
eds., 2009). 
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(IP Court), a specialty court with priority jurisdiction over IP cases,57 
illustrated the attitude of Taiwanese judges towards this type of 
patents.58 The plaintiff in this case was the Japanese Takeda 
Pharmaceutical Company that initially held a patent for the 
combination of an anti-diabetic drug, brand-named Actos, and other 
anti-diabetic drugs. Takeda later acquired Patent No. 63119 (’119 
patent) for a tetrahydrothiazolyl-thione derivative, which is the 
metabolite of Actos’ active ingredient, pioglitazone hydrochloride. 
Pioglitazone itself and the active metabolite were both responsible for 
causing the desired anti-diabetic effects in the human body. The 
defendant in this case was China Chemical & Pharmaceutical Co., 
Ltd. (CCPC), a Taiwanese pharmaceutical company, which intended 
to manufacture and sell a generic version of pioglitazone after the 
Actos patent expired. CCPC filed with the Taiwanese Food and Drug 
Administration (TFDA) and obtained a drug license on July 12, 2006. 
Takeda later filed an infringement suit against CCPC based on the 
’119 patent.59 
Takeda argued that patients necessarily produce the metabolite 
through metabolism after consuming the generic drug of pioglitazone. 
However, patients were unaware of this metabolic process, which 
occurred unconsciously, and in reality equated to a tool for CCPC to 
infringe the metabolite patent. Therefore, by manufacturing and 
selling this drug CCPC directly infringed Takeda’s ’119 patent of the 
pioglitazone metabolite. Alternatively, CCPC knowingly aided 
patients in infringing the ’119 patent, resulting in indirect 
infringement of this patent by CCPC.60 The defendant countered that 
the ’119 patent lacked novelty and non-obviousness, and was thus 
invalid on grounds of the metabolite having previously been disclosed 
in the pertinent literature and pharmacopoeia. In light of this 
disclosure any person could have produced the metabolite by simply 
consuming pioglitazone, leading a PHOSITA to easily create the 
metabolite. In the alternative, CCPC argued that regardless of the 
 
 57. Taiwan’s IP Court enjoys priority jurisdiction over civil and administrative IP 
litigations in the first and second instances, and criminal IP litigations only in the second 
instance. 
 58. Rishang Wutian Yaopin Gongye Gufen Youxian Gongsi, Zhongguo Huaxue Zhiyao 
Gufen Youxian Gongsi (日商武田藥品工業股份有限公司, 中國化學製藥股份有限公司) 
[Takeda Pharm. Co. v. China Chem. & Pharm. Co.], 97 Civil Patent Suit Judgment No. 5 (Intell. 
Prop. Ct., Oct. 28, 2008) (Taiwan), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 97 Civil Patent Appeals 
Judgment No. 20 (Intell. Prop. Ct. Mar. 19, 2009) (Taiwan), available at 
http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/Index.htm. 
 59. Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶¶ 1.1, 1.3. 
 60. Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 1.4. 
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’119 patent’s validity it did not directly infringed the ’119 patent, 
since it did not manufacture or sell the metabolite, but rather 
pioglitazone. Consequently, the defendant should not be responsible 
for inducement or contributory infringement of the patent.61 
The IP Court’s division of first instance ruled that the ’119 
patent is valid but that the defendant did not infringe it. In the 
judgment, the court did not expound on the patent’s validity, but 
instead merely analyzed whether infringement had occurred. With 
regard to direct infringement, the court noted that the defendant 
produced generic drugs that only contained pioglitazone not the 
metabolite of the ’119 patent. The active ingredient recorded in the 
defendant’s instruction label also was pioglitazone that differed in its 
chemical structure from the claimed metabolite. The court held that 
the plaintiff could not expand the scope of the ’119 patent scope to 
include pioglitazone. Furthermore, although pioglitazone converted 
into the claimed metabolite after natural metabolism in the human 
body, this was not the result of human controlled will or effort, nor it 
did involve any commercial sales or advertisement. Thus, the 
defendant’s actions were not related to practicing the invention of the 
’119 patent. The plaintiff argued that consumption of pioglitazone by 
third parties (patients) with the drug’s conversion into the ’119 
patent’s metabolite within the human body constituted “direct 
manufacturing” and “use” by the defendant. The court explicitly 
rejected the plaintiff’s inference of a third parties’ acts being the 
deliberate consequence of the defendant’s acts.62 
On indirect infringement, the court noted that “inducement” 
refers to the formation of intention after notification and 
encouragement by others, whereas “contributory infringement” 
referred to assisting the direct infringer to fulfill her existing 
intentions. However, indirect infringement still requires that direct 
infringers understand the consequences of their acts, which was not 
the case here. Moreover, the defendant only sold a generic drug 
containing pioglitazone without the instruction label notifying 
patients that digesting the drug would result in the metabolite of the 
’119 patent, and refrained from encouraging patients to “intentionally 
manufacture” this metabolite. As a result, the court found the 
defendant’s acts to be inconsistent with the elements of inducement 
and contributory infringement.63 
 
 61. Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 2.4. 
 62. Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 5.4. 
 63. Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 5.4. 
WANG & HUANG  4/18/2013  1:28 AM 
508 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 29 
Upon appeal the IP Court’s appellate division agreed with the 
opinion from the division of first instance, holding that the disputed 
patent was valid, but that the defendant did not directly or indirectly 
infringe the ’119 patent.64 Regarding validity, the appellate court 
found the appellee’s evidence only contained basic drug activity tests 
relating to pioglitazone and its analogs, but lacking the claimed 
metabolite, and therefore failed to prove lack of novelty of the ’119 
patent.65 Concerning direct and joint infringement, the appellate court 
reasoned similarly to the division of first instance’s opinion. 
This case illustrates that Taiwan’s patent law has not adopted the 
inherent anticipation doctrine to refute the novelty of active 
metabolite patents. Rather, according to the Taiwanese IP Court the 
metabolite production through unconscious human metabolism does 
not constitute practicing the invention of metabolite patents. The court 
found that there was no basis for finding for inducement and 
contributory infringement due to the lack of direct infringing 
practices. The ruling paved the way for generic drugs to the market 
despite patents covering the active metabolites of those generic drugs. 
Notably, Taiwan has not expressly codified indirect infringement in 
its patent law. Metabolite patent holders who wish to claim their 
rights from generic drug manufacturers in the name of inducement or 
contributory infringement can only resort to the joint infringement 
provision under the Taiwanese tort law, where the direct infringer’s 
intention or negligence plays a potential role in determining indirect 
infringement. Thus, in terms of statutory provisions for indirect 
infringement, differences arise to other countries. 
VII.THEORETICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND 
TRANSNATIONAL CATEGORIZATION 
The countries discussed above demonstrate contradicting 
attitudes towards active metabolite patents. No consistent solution has 
emerged for those patents possibly preventing generic drugs from 
entering the market place even after patents for the generic drugs have 
expired. In this chapter, the authors introduce a technological analysis 
and insightful theoretical perspectives to rationally assess the various 
different approaches. Plausible solutions are then summarized for a 
 
 64. Rishang Wutian Yaopin Gongye Gufen Youxian Gongsi, Zhongguo Huaxue Zhiyao 
Gufen Youxian Gongsi (日商武田藥品工業股份有限公司, 中國化學製藥股份有限公司) 
[Takeda Pharm. Co. v. China Chem. & Pharm. Co.], 97 Civil Patent Appeals Judgment No. 20 
(Intell. Prop. Ct. Mar. 19, 2009) (Taiwan), available at http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/Index.htm. 
 65. Id. Facts and Reasoning ¶ 5.3.3.4-.5. 
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separate and more focused investigation and deliberation. 
A. A Portion of Active Metabolites Deserves Patent Protection 
When considering how the patent law treats active metabolites, 
the focus of that task hinges on whether those metabolites deserve 
patent protection. Commentators have indicated that metabolites and 
original compounds before metabolism are just two forms of the same 
substance. Although their chemical structures differ, chemical 
formulae are only the “textual” manifestation for documenting 
chemical compounds. Although the external appearances of 
compounds prior to metabolism and their active metabolites differ, 
the two actually possess the same pharmacology, treating the same 
physiological effects. Thus, the differences between the two are 
insubstantial and negligible, existing only in the appearance and the 
“textual” form of documentation. In essence, they exert identical 
treatment results. Pursuant to this line of thought, active metabolites 
seem to lack the value for patent protection.66 
This article argues nonetheless that a portion of active 
metabolites may possess characteristics that differ from those of the 
compounds before metabolism. Those characteristics may cause the 
metabolites to have unique value and significance in pharmacological 
and medical practice, which makes them worthy of patent protection. 
Consider the case of diazepam and oxazepam as an example. 
Diazepam is a pre-metabolic compound, whereas oxazepam is an 
active metabolite of diazepam following metabolism. The two use the 
same pharmacological mechanism to sedate and relax the patient’s 
muscles. However, diazepam was later found to have a longer 
sedative effect than oxazepam. Thus, physicians typically prescribe 
diazepam as a sleep medication. By contrast, oxazepam has only a 
brief sedative effect. Thus, oxazepam is rather used as a tranquilizer 
not as a sleep medication. Additionally, because oxazepam does not 
require hepatic metabolism, it is less harmful to liver function than 
diazepam and more appropriate for older adults and patients with liver 
disease.67 
The diazepam-oxazepam example shows that active metabolites 
are not merely the flip side of pre-metabolic compounds. The 
 
 66. JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 386 (2005); Shayana Kadidal, 
Digestion as Infringement: The Problem of Pro-Drugs, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
241, 249 (1996). 
 67. N.A. Buckley et al., Relative Toxicity of Benzodiazepines in Overdose, 310 BRIT. 
MED. J. 219 (1995), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2548618/pdf/bmj00577-0021.pdf. 
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differences between the two are not necessarily restricted to their 
chemical structure. In practice, many active metabolites differ from 
pre-metabolic compounds in their side effects, prolonged 
effectiveness, and mechanisms of action.68 This proves that active 
metabolites are not merely another form of pre-metabolic compounds, 
but constitute at least in some instances new and unique substances. 
Therefore, active metabolites are potentially valuable and deserving 
of patent protection. 
The patent law was established to award a period of exclusivity 
to encourage research and promote the accumulation and disclosure 
of technical knowledge. In contrast, the patent law also guarantees the 
public to freely utilize patented inventions, servicing public interest, 
after the patents to those inventions have expired. Considering active 
metabolite patents a restrictive attitude should be adopted if the goal 
is to guarantee the public’s free use of medicines from expired 
patents. However, this runs contrary to the patent law’s to encourage 
innovation and promote public disclosure. If active metabolites are 
deemed unpatentable, the patent law provides no incentive to the 
further study of unknown pharmacological metabolisms. It would also 
fail to provide incentives for inventors to disclose newly-found active 
metabolites. However, if the emphasis is to encourage research and 
disclosure of new and useful metabolic compounds and mechanisms, 
the public may be denied access to affordable generic drugs from 
expired patents.69 
Metabolic mechanisms and active metabolites have been 
identified as having potential value in pharmacological and medical 
practice as described above. How patent law should treat active 
metabolites in order to adequately satisfy its many policy objectives is 
a difficult but important task. Below, the authors put forward three 
possible solutions to address this issue based on various countries’ 
jurisprudence, including comments on their usefulness and feasibility. 
B. Possible Mode I: Inherent Anticipation Doctrine 
The U.K. and the U.S. courts mainly employed the inherent 
anticipation doctrine to refute the patentability of active metabolites.70 
Under this doctrine, novelty is lost based on known pre-metabolic 
compounds, and patents cannot claim the scope of the invention to 
include active metabolites formed upon metabolizing those pre-
 
 68. Correa, supra note 54, at 18. 
 69. Frost, supra note 40, at 369, 377-78. 
 70. See supra Part III.B; supra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
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metabolic compounds. Thus, this doctrine can effectively resolve 
problems with active metabolite patents, which otherwise would 
prevent generic drugs of those metabolites from entering the market 
place. However, when the scope of the claims is expressly limited to 
include only active metabolites that have been purified or were 
synthesized in vitro, those claims fall outside the realm of inherent 
anticipation. The latter case preserves the incentive to research and 
disclose new metabolic mechanisms and compounds. The inherent 
anticipation doctrine consequently appears to be a suitable model for 
addressing active metabolites in patent law. 
On the other hand, over utilizing the inherent anticipation 
doctrine can lead to broadly expanding and distorting the doctrine 
itself. This doctrine bridges the gap between written technical features 
in a prior art reference and the genuine features of the referenced 
technology. Occasionally, prior art references do not disclose in 
writing all the technical features of an invention, but on the basis of 
their professional experience and knowledge, PHOSITAs can still 
realize the omitted, but implied features. This situation led to the rise 
of the inherent anticipation doctrine, which allowed judges and patent 
examiners to recite technical features that were not expressly written 
into the specification of a prior patent but could be discerned from it 
by the PHOSITA to refute novelty of later patents. This application of 
the doctrine avoids awarding or maintaining patents on inventions 
that appear novel on its face but have lacked novelty in substance 
from the PHOSITA’s point of view.71  
However, the doctrine originally was applied in a situation quite 
different from the active metabolite patents, where a PHOSITA could 
not necessarily discern the omitted but in-fact-present technical 
features from the prior art reference. The early leading case of the 
inherent anticipation doctrine, Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto 
Co.,72 amply demonstrates the doctrine’s original meaning and 
function. Continental Can’s patent covered a plastic can having 
hollow ribs. Continental Can sued Monsanto for infringing its patent. 
During litigation, Monsanto provided a prior art reference disclosing a 
container with hollow ribs.73 However, the reference itself did not 
expressly disclose the ribs to be hollow, but instead that the ribs were 
manufactured according to conventional blow molding techniques.74 
 
 71. Herbert, supra note 40, at 116-17. 
 72. Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 73. Id. at 1267-68. 
 74. Id. 
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In its decision, the CAFC noted that in determining novelty extrinsic 
evidence could complement a prior art reference that does not 
expressly disclose certain technological features. If the extrinsic 
evidence shows that common knowledge in the technical field could 
fill the gap, and thus enable the PHOSITA to recognize the omitted 
features from the reference, those absent features have actually been 
implicitly disclosed in the prior art. If all technological features of an 
invention are simultaneously disclosed in a single prior art reference, 
the invention lacks novelty and the patent should be invalidated. In 
this case, if extrinsic evidence demonstrates that blow molding 
techniques invariably generate hollow ribs, which is also recognized 
by the PHOSITA, then the prior art has implicitly disclosed the 
“hollow ribs” feature.75 Consequently, the CAFC remanded the case 
for further proceeding to clarify this factual issue. 
The Continental Can case showed that two conditions are 
necessary for applying the inherent anticipation doctrine: (1) the 
omitted technological features are inherently present as disclosed in 
the prior art reference; (2) a PHOSITA could recognize the omitted 
features on the basis of the prior art reference. In Schering Corp., in 
sharp contrast, the CAFC changed the requirements for applying this 
doctrine, and now only the first condition has to be met. The second 
condition since then has been dropped from the inherency analysis.76 
This development has raised controversies and intense discussions 
regarding its fairness and the suitable criteria for the doctrine to 
apply.77 
For applying the inherent anticipation doctrine, the authors 
contend that the second condition in the Continental Can decision 
should still be maintained. Excluding the criterion that the PHOSITA 
is able to recognize the omitted features is contrary to the original 
purpose of the doctrine, which was based on the premises to have the 
PHOSITA’s general knowledge assist in interpreting the prior art 
reference. Furthermore, the doctrine will be inconsistent with the 
settled concepts of “prior arts” and “novelty” as used in patent law. 
 
 75. Id. at 1268-69. See also MUELLER, supra note 8, at 129-31. 
 76. The turning point of the U.S. case law concerning the inherent anticipation doctrine is 
Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Irving N. Feit & 
Christina L. Warrick, Inherency in Patent Law, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 19-21 
(2003); Todd R. Miller, Patented Compounds Inherently Coproduced as Trace Impurities: 
Issues of Inherent Anticipation and Literal Infringement, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 425, 452 (2004). 
 77. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 
372-74 (2005); Steven C. Carlson, Inherent Anticipation, 40 IDEA 297, 306-18 (2000); Feit & 
Warrick, supra note 76, at 21; Herbert, supra note 40, at 113-14; Miller, supra note 76, at 442; 
Mueller & Chisum, supra note 37, at 1102-05. 
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Prior art refers to technical knowledge that already falls within the 
public domain, whereas novelty identifies new information that is still 
privately held outside of the public domain. If the requirement of 
PHOSITA’s recognition were eliminated, technological features 
unknown to the PHOSITA would be deemed prior art that would 
defeat the novelty of these features. However, since these features 
have never been explicitly disclosed to the public or are known to the 
PHOSITA, the public will in all actuality be unable to use or share the 
technology associated with these features. The core quid pro quo in 
patent law rests on the public freely and openly learning, sharing, and 
utilizing these technologies and other types of information while 
granting a limited monopoly to the inventor. Thus, neglecting the 
PHOSITA recognition requirement will result in serious 
contradictions with the widely accepted notions of public domain and 
novelty.78 Therefore, the authors conclude that PHOSITA’s 
recognition should be required when applying the inherent 
anticipation doctrine. 
Turning back to the issue of active metabolites, if the 
PHOSITA’s recognition requirement is reinstated, metabolite patents 
may not be inherently anticipated by prior art disclosing their 
corresponding pre-metabolic drugs. Since the PHOSITA cannot 
identify any technological features of the active metabolites from the 
prior art reference, patents for those metabolites can still retain their 
novelty under this doctrine. The authors hence believe that the 
inherent anticipation doctrine, if applied in this manner, would not be 
a suitable model to resolve the controversies regarding active 
metabolite patents. 
C. Possible Mode II: Product of Nature Doctrine 
Turning to active metabolite patents and patent evergreening, a 
number of commentators suggested employing the product of nature 
doctrine to confront this problem.79 For example, § 101 of the U.S. 
Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) specifies the scope of patentable 
 
 78. Herbert, supra note 40, at 123. But see Burk & Lemley, supra note 77, at 374. 
 79. EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F.3d 1342, 1350-51 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); ICN Pharm., Inc. v. Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1051 
(C.D. Cal. 2003); Burk & Lemley, supra note 77, at 403-08; Cynthia Chen, Note, Schering 
Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Clarification of the Inherent Anticipation Doctrine and 
Its Implications, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 95, 113 (2005); Herbert, supra note 40, at 143-45. See 
also Torrance, supra note 14, at 1500-05. Torrance puts forth a physiological steps doctrine, 
which considers products and processes of in vivo conversion are unpatentable subject matters. 
The essence of that doctrine and the natural product doctrine is quite similar, and from the 
authors’ point of view could be effectively classified into the same category. Id. 
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subject matters to include any invention or discovery on a “process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”80 The term 
“discovery” in this section does not refer to the original meaning of 
the term, but instead constitutes a synonym for invention.81 Pure 
discovery of natural products or phenomena is still not an invention 
that is patentable under § 101.82 In Gottschalk v. Benson,83 the U.S. 
Supreme Court set up the taxonomy of unpatentable subject matters to 
comprise laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas. The 
court noted that those types of discoveries are the collective treasures 
of the human race, which should be shared by the general public 
without constraint, and thus may not be preempted by patent 
owners.84 In the same vein, Taiwan’s patent examination guidelines 
espouse similar rules, stating that pure scientific discoveries of 
objects, phenomena, and laws that are inherent in the natural world 
are not patentable subject matters.85 
At the extreme end of the spectrum, India’s patent law adopts an 
entirely negative attitude toward active metabolite patents. It posits 
that active metabolites are fundamentally products of nature and 
should not be granted patents. The rationale of this position is that the 
identification of active metabolites is merely a discovery, not an 
invention, involving a level of technological innovation that is 
relatively low. Thus, awarding process patents with weaker 
exclusivity should be appropriate, whereas product patents granting 
stronger exclusivity in exchange for disclosure are deemed 
unnecessary and too restrictive.86 On this basis, active metabolites are 
excluded from patent protection, regardless whether they are 
produced through metabolism or in vitro. 
The authors propose that the product of nature doctrine may lend 
itself to mitigate the problems caused by active metabolite patents. 
Nevertheless, the doctrine does not necessarily refute patentability of 
 
 80. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 81. ALBERT HENRY WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA § 2, at 2 (2d ed. 1889). 
 82. See Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 292 F. 480, 481 (3d Cir. 1923); Morton v. N.Y. Eye 
Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865). 
 83. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 84. Id. at 71-72. 
 85. Faming Zhuanli Shiti Shencha (發明專利實體審查) [Patent Examination Guidelines] 
(promulgated by Intell. Prop. Office, Ministry of Econ. Affairs in 1994, effective on Nov. 27, 
1994, as revised in 2004) tit. 2, ch. 2, sec. 1.3.2 (Taiwan). 
 86. Herbert, supra note 40, at 144-46. 
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natural substances that are purified or synthesized in vitro. The U.S. 
patent law, for instance, holds that if those substances were obtained 
by human intervention and differ sufficiently from products as found 
in their natural states, they can still meet the requirement under § 101 
and thus are deemed patentable subject matters.87 Currently, a number 
of judicial U.S. decisions held that natural products in their purified 
states are patentable.88 This rule was first articulated in the Parke-
Davis case.89 Here, the disputed invention involved epinephrine in its 
purified state. Because epinephrine is an important hormone naturally 
secreted and formed in the human body, it is undoubtedly a “product 
of nature.” In this case, the inventor Takamine developed a method of 
separating epinephrine from glandular tissue, which resulted in 
epinephrine unadulterated by other organic matter. Takamine applied 
for patents of the separation method and purified epinephrine.90 
However, using epinephrine for treatment purposes was already 
established in the medical field prior to Takamine’s separation 
method. The traditional practice included air-drying and crushing 
animal adrenal glands prior to dissolving them into an organic 
solution. This solution, which comprised a number of organic residual 
substances, was then injected into the patient for treatment with some 
of these substances being harmful to the patient.91 With regard to the 
patentability of epinephrine in its purified state, the court stated that 
no regulations indicated that extracts of products of nature are 
unpatentable. The court further noted that Takamine was the first 
person to separate epinephrine from glandular tissue. As for its 
medical benefit, the unadulterated epinephrine was actually a brand 
new substance with substantial commercial and therapeutic value. 
Consequently, the court held epinephrine in its purified state to be 
worthy of patent protection.92 
In light of the tremendous value of purified or synthesized 
products of nature, as in the case of purified epinephrine, the product 
of nature doctrine under the U.S. law that distinguishes between in 
vitro and metabolically produced substances provides an excellent 
 
 87. MUELLER, supra note 8, at 226. 
 88. W. Lesser, Nature or Nurture: Is There a Case Basis for a Judicially Created 
‘Product of Nature’ Exclusion? Are Genes Somehow Different?, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 318, 347-50 (2011). 
 89. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d. Cir. 1912). 
 90. Id. at 97. 
 91. Id. at 106. 
 92. Id. at 103. 
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approach for assessing patentability of materials with natural origins. 
Regarding active metabolites, the example of diazepam and its 
metabolite, oxazepam, demonstrated that active metabolites might, 
too, possess unique pharmacological properties that are different from 
those of their original pre-metabolic compounds.93 The discovery of 
unadulterated active metabolites and the process of in vitro 
production through isolation and purification or synthesis thus 
represent technological progress. The distinction between adulterated 
metabolites formed through natural metabolism and those that are 
purified or synthesized in vitro may strike a desirable balance 
between assuring affordable medicine and promoting pharmaceutical 
innovation. Declining patents for in vivo metabolites prevents patent 
evergreening and could accelerate the market entry of generic drugs. 
On the other hand, affording patent protection for purified or in vitro 
synthesized metabolites may provide a proper incentive for valuable 
pharmaceutical development. For these reasons, the authors believe 
that unadulterated active metabolites that are produced in vitro are 
worthy of the protection afforded under the patent system. 
However, some shortcoming of product of nature doctrine may 
be fatal despite this doctrine trying to adequately address the issue of 
active metabolite patents. The most serious problem lies with this 
doctrine’s unpredictability. What falls under products of nature is 
considerably ambiguous. There is no settled meaning or definite 
scope for this concept in patent law. The intuition of judges or 
examiners regarding the disputed subject matter may sometimes 
become a controlling factor. For instance, the patentability of DNA 
sequences had once been settled for more than ten years. But in recent 
years, it has been fiercely challenged in the Association for Molecular 
Pathology case in U.S. courtrooms. The district court found in 2010 
that isolated DNA did not possess markedly different characteristics 
from those of natural DNA in human cells despite their structural and 
functional differences, and thus was unpatentable under the product of 
nature doctrine.94 On appeal, the CAFC overturned the decision of the 
lower court,95 which was in turn vacated by the Supreme Court and 
remanded for further consideration96 in view of Mayo Collaborative 
 
 93. For detailed explanation of diazepam and oxazepam see supra Part VII.A. 
 94. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181, 227-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), 
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 95. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 96. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
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Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., where the Court recently 
held another type of subject matters unpatentable as a law of nature.97 
This contentious case illuminates the uncertainty and divergence 
about the character and scope of unpatentable natural products. 
The situation is further exacerbated by mutual overlap between 
different types of unpatentable subject matters. New development in 
one category of unpatentable subject matters may create percussions 
for another. Before deciding on its merits, the Supreme Court 
remanded the Mayo Collaborative Services case,98 requiring the 
Federal Circuit to reconsider it in light of Bilski v. Kappos,99 a newly 
delivered Supreme Court decision concerning abstract ideas—a third 
category of unpatentable subject matters. The invention at issue in 
Mayo Collaborative Services—methods for measuring proper dosage 
of thiopurine to treat autoimmune diseases,100 is quite dissimilar to the 
claimed invention in Bilski, where the applicant filed for patents on 
methods of hedging risk in energy trading market.101 The underlying 
rationales for the Supreme Court to rule the subject matter to be 
unpatentable in those two cases diverge considerably. However, the 
mutual impact and chain reaction among different types of 
unpatentable subject matters, as illustrated in Bilski, Mayo 
Collaborative Services and Association for Molecular Pathology, 
demonstrate instability spread from one group to another. This 
phenomenon significantly intensifies the uncertainty in securing 
patents and casts unnecessary doubts on products with natural origins. 
For these reasons elaborated above in this section, those that originate 
from human bodies yet purified or synthesized in vitro should be 
adequately awarded patent protection. In light of the serious 
shortcomings of instability and uncertainty, the product of nature 
doctrine would not be an appropriate solution to the issue of active 
metabolite patents. 
D. Possible Mode III: Non-Practice Theory 
Besides dealing with active metabolites through the principles of 
patentability, Taiwan’s IP Court utilized an alternative approach by 
 
 97. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (holding 
that claims directed to the relationship between the concentrations of blood metabolites and 
response to a therapeutic drug are not eligible for a patent because they incorporate laws of 
nature). 
 98. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010). 
 99. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 100. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1295-96. 
 101. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223-24. 
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way of assessing infringement. In the Takeda v. CCPC case,102 the 
court found that although the generic version of pioglitazone 
produced the patented active metabolite through metabolism in 
humans, this in vivo production was entirely unknown to any patient 
taking pioglitazone. A patient was not capable of controlling the 
metabolic process by his or her own will or acts, nor did it involve 
any commercial sales of the claimed active metabolite. Thus, the 
court ruled that the metabolic production was unrelated to the 
practicing of the asserted metabolite patent, hence did not constitute 
patent infringement.103 
In its decision, the Taiwanese IP Court articulated a “non-
practice theory” to confront the problem of market entry barrier that 
generic drugs suffer owing to active metabolite patents. As for 
patients that take generic drugs, patents on those drugs either expired 
or were ruled invalid. What patients consciously consume are 
medicines that are already beyond the term of patent exclusivity. 
Although active metabolites are in reality formed inside the patients’ 
bodies by taking these generics, these patients could hardly know 
about the metabolites being produced inside their bodies. They may 
not know that their metabolism produces these active metabolites, nor 
do they consciously force their bodies to manufacture or use these 
claimed metabolites. Given the fact that this unconscious metabolism 
is not self-inflicted by those patients, it may not be reasonably 
counted as a human act that could be culpable for legal liability and 
punishment.104 Actually, metabolism is a chemical process that the 
patients cannot control or intervene by their own will. Thus, it would 
be absurd to hold these patients accountable for such unconscious and 
involuntary processes that quietly carry on in their bodies. From this 
point of view, under a non-practice theory in vivo metabolism should 
be excluded from the scope of infringing acts under the patent law. 
The non-practice approach just exempts metabolic reactions in 
human bodies from infringement liability. It still maintains patent 
protection over active metabolites that are purified or synthesized in 
 
 102. See supra Part VI. 
 103. See supra text accompanying notes 57-61 for further details in this case. 
 104. See, e.g., People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 404-05 (Ct. App. 1970). The court 
stated that unconsciousness, when not self-induced (e.g., voluntary intoxication), is a complete 
defense to a criminal act. Id. Unconsciousness need not be confined to physical dimensions as 
commonly associated with the term; it can exist mentally as well, where the person in fact acts, 
but is not at the time conscious of her action. Id. at 405. See also United States v. Gracidas-
Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1196 n.11 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that sleepwalking falls within the 
category of unconscious behavior and that the act a person commits during sleepwalking is not 
criminally culpable); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(b) (1962). 
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vitro. This distinction adequately controls the claim scope of active 
metabolite patents, striking a fine balance between protecting 
pharmaceutical inventions and making medicine more affordable. It 
also avoids the problems of patent evergreening and preventing 
market entry by generic pharmaceuticals, both caused by a 
proliferation of secondary patents.105 Unlike the product of nature 
doctrine, whose basic rationale is rooted in the vague concept of a 
natural world without human intervention, this theory in particular is 
based on the concept of unconsciousness that is a unique 
characteristics of in vivo processes such as metabolism and digestion. 
This focused underlying rationale enables the theory to have an 
unambiguous connotation and clear scope of application, preventing 
the shortcomings of instability and uncertainty, from which the 
product of nature doctrine has suffered. 
One of the main functions that the patent system performs is to 
provide incentive for inventors to improve upon existing 
technologies.106 Some commentators have argued that inventing upon 
patents is socially wasteful in that it might attract investment to the 
task of finding redundant solutions to already solved problems.107 It is 
undeniable, on the other hand, that designing around an invention is 
the most common and feasible method to mitigate blockages that 
patents bring about.108 Relatively, compound patents are difficult to 
invent around due to their respective idiosyncrasies. A good approach 
that releases active metabolites generated in vivo from infringement 
liability, such as the non-practice theory, may provide a significant 
conduit for inventing around in the pharmaceutical field. When 
researchers successfully identify the pre-metabolic compound of a 
patented drug through endeavors, they may make use of the leeway 
for active metabolites as discussed above to compete with the drug on 
the market. Those pre-metabolic compounds are called “pro-drugs.” 
They can be induced to convert into the patented medicine through 
 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94 for further explanation. 
 106. State Indus., Inc. v. A. O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985); ROGER 
E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, 
PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 289 (2003); Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting 
and Scientific Research: The Case for Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 
10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251, 265, 325 (2008). 
 107. E.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 51 (Comm. Print 
1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup). 
 108. John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) Than “Off Switches”: Patent-
Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1408-09 (2012). 
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metabolism inside of the patient’s body.109 If the patented drug and 
pro-drug accomplish substantially the same function and result in 
substantially the same way, the doctrine of equivalents becomes 
applicable and the pro-drug would still infringe on the drug patent. 
Otherwise, the non-practice theory could provide a feasible way for 
pharmaceutical inventing around, a common practice in other fields of 
technology.110 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
This article begins with an overview of transnational 
jurisprudence in tackling the problem of active metabolite patents, 
which may instigate drug patent evergreening and hence delaying the 
market entry of generic medicine. The United States and the United 
Kingdom adopt the inherent anticipation doctrine, considering active 
metabolites as inherent in prior art references concerning the 
corresponding pre-metabolic compounds, usually the active 
ingredients of the drug, and therefore refute novelty of those 
metabolite claims. The authors believe this approach removes the key 
component of PHOSITA recognition from the notion of prior arts, 
hence stretching the novelty analysis too thin. It runs against the 
settled meaning of the public domain as well. 
India’s patent law traces an extreme position in the aspect of the 
product of nature doctrine. Metabolites are by definition products of 
metabolism, a process of nature. Based on this reason, Indian law 
categorically treats metabolites as products of nature, one type of 
well-recognized unpatentable subject matters. There are also more 
modest versions of the product of nature doctrine, which still retain 
patent protection for metabolites purified or synthesized in vitro. No 
matter which version of the doctrine, however, they all suffer from 
instability and uncertainty with regard to patentability determination. 
The critical shortcoming makes this approach unadvisable. 
Taiwan’s IP Court suggests a third approach, the non-practice 
theory. In light of the unconsciousness of metabolism in vivo, this 
theory exempts the use and production of metabolites in human 
bodies from the scope of infringing practices under patent law. This 
 
 109. Kadidal, supra note 66, at 241-42. 
 110. See id. at 241-43 (noting that the practice of using pro-drugs to design around 
pharmaceutical patents has existed for decades, but the controversies concerning active 
metabolites are relatively new). The introduction of the non-practice theory would clear the 
blockage from metabolite patents and stabilize the original status of pro-drugs. Enormous 
expansion of inventing around and pro-drug competition, on the other hand, might not come into 
being eventually. 
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new approach distinguishes between metabolites unconsciously 
produced in vivo and those purified or synthesized in vitro, striking a 
right balance between encouraging pharmaceutical innovations and 
providing affordable medicine. Following the in vivo-in vitro 
distinction, the theory adequately curbs the claim scope of active 
metabolite patents, increasing affordable medicine by more market 
entry of generics and inventing around through pro-drugs. The article 
is confident that the non-practice theory should be a preferable 
approach to confronting the problems that patents for active 
metabolites may generate. 
 
